Talaado 15-Octo-2024 {HMC} Egypt and Sudan have doubled down on their opposition to the newly ratified Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), marking a new chapter in the long-standing regional dispute over water resources. Now ratified by six upstream countries, the CFA officially came into force on October 13, deepening the divide between Nile Basin nations.
Cairo and Khartoum, historically the most dominant players in the Nile waters debate, issued a joint statement after the Egyptian-Sudanese Permanent Joint Technical Commission for the Nile Waters (PJTC) meeting in Cairo on October 11-12. Their message was unequivocal: the CFA’s ratification threatens the region’s delicate balance. The two nations called for restoring the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), advocating for an inclusive framework that prevents unilateral actions by upstream countries. “The six-state commission based on the incomplete CFA cannot represent the interests of the entire Nile Basin,” the statement read.
The statement pointed out that the new six-member Nile River Basin Commission, born from the CFA, falls short of representing the interests of all riparian nations. “This is not an accord that can speak for the entire Nile Basin,” the PJTC declared, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the new body.
The CFA’s ratification by Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda has set the stage for intensified regional tensions. While the agreement aims to establish the Nile River Basin Commission to oversee equitable water sharing, the crux of Egypt and Sudan’s objection is clear: they consider the CFA a direct challenge to historical water rights secured under the 1929 and 1959 colonial-era treaties Nile River Agreements, which allocate the majority of Nile waters to Egypt and Sudan, remain binding under international law.
Egypt’s rejection of the CFA is rooted in its reliance on the Nile for 98% of its water supply. President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi emphasized this during his recent speech at the Cairo Water Week, stating that water security is Egypt’s top priority. “We cannot afford to lose a single drop of water,” he said, reiterating the country’s concerns over the construction of Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam—a colossal hydropower endeavour that has become a national symbol of modernity and independence. However, the dam represents an existential threat for Egypt and Sudan, reducing their control over a river they’ve depended on for millennia.
The CFA’s ratification by upstream states, including Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya, has triggered an avalanche of political and geopolitical ramifications. Ethiopia views the CFA and the dam as critical for its economic development, while Egypt has strengthened alliances with other African nations, including Somalia, to counter Ethiopia’s influence.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has hailed the CFA’s ratification as a historic step towards a more equitable sharing of the Nile’s bounty. “We stand united in our vision for sustainable development, where all Nile Basin countries benefit,” Abiy said earlier this year. His words, however, have not eased the growing unease downstream.
The wider geopolitical implications of the Nile dispute are also evident. In August, Cairo and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation agreement to counter Ethiopia’s influence in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has welcomed Egypt’s offer to deploy peacekeepers as part of the African Union Mission to Support Stabilization in Somalia (AUSSOM), which will replace the outgoing ATMIS mission in December.
This development follows a trilateral summit in Asmara, Eritrea, where Somali, Egyptian, and Eritrean leaders pledged to bolster security cooperation. Egypt’s increasing military involvement in Somalia, including arms shipments and peacekeepers, is seen as a counter to Ethiopia’s regional influence, particularly after Ethiopia signed an MoU to access to Somaliland’s coastline for a naval base. Ethiopia has expressed concerns over Egypt’s role in Somalia, fearing it may destabilize the region and threaten its own strategic interests, including access to the Red Sea and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Source Hiiraan Online
