Sunday 6, Oct 2024 {HMC} International partners and countries contributing troops to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia are uneasy with the growing influence of Somalia’s new-found ally Egypt, whose military is to be deployed as part of the new security arrangement for the Horn of Africa nation after the expiry of the current African Union’s peacekeeping mandate.
Regional security experts intimated to The EastAfrican that the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa—with Egypt arming Somalia and the latter freezing Ethiopia out of the security arrangement set to succeed the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis)—have triggered unease among the donors.
This comes at a time the AU and United Nations are in consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia and its security allies, ahead of submitting a report by November 15, 2024, for the post-Atmis mission, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom), set to start on January 1, 2025.
The donors’ concern is that the inclusion of Egyptian troops in Aussom at the expense of Ethiopian forces, who have been part of peacekeeping missions in Somalia since 2014, is a strategic win for Egypt, which has been at loggerheads with Addis Ababa over the Nile waters, and this may escalate tensions in the Horn.
It has emerged that there is also some pushback by a section of the current troop-contributing countries (TCCs) against Egypt in Aussom, who argue that the entry of the North African nation’s military would disrupt the structure of the mission.
Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia and Djibouti have been the mainstay of the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia, joining at different stages of the mission.
“Structurally, the next mission will not be different to the previous arrangements,” Henry Okello Oryem, Uganda’s State Minister for International Affairs told The EastAfrican. “It may be operationally different, but not structure.”
Uganda is Somalia’s key security partner, being the first country to put boots on the ground in March 2007, with Burundi troops arriving in December, while Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia were formally integrated into the peacekeeping force in 2011, 2012 and 2014, respectively, as the mission expanded.
“The TCCs are asking, why does Egypt want to join now, where have they been all this time? They should have come much earlier,” said Mr Oryem.
Egypt wants a major role in Somalia’s security arrangement for at least five years, seeking to deploy some 10,000 troops, half of whom will serve under the Aussom structure, while the remainder provide security as an independent mission under a bilateral deal signed in August, when Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Cairo.
Egypt’s offer of 5,000 troops to Aussom is nearly half of the 11,146 uniformed military personnel that the mission will have, in addition to 680 police officers and 85 civilian staff, for a proposed period of five years, upon approval by the UN Security Council.
With its proposed numbers, Egypt would dominate Aussom, a heavily equipped smaller and leaner force compared with Amisom/Atmis at their peak of deployment, with the priority to increase the operational capacity of the Somali National Army and operate with a new mandate to also protect the civilian population against the al-Shabaab violent extremism.
Last month, the Institute for Global Studies (IGS) reported that the first officers of Egypt’s independent mission arrived in Somalia on August 27 aboard two C-130 transport aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force, which unloaded personnel, equipment and assets destined to be deployed in Hiran region, Hirshabelle, Southwestern Federated States and Galmudug.
When fully deployed, this will turn Egypt into Somalia’s main military partner, but one that risks distorting the nature of military support for Somali stability and the fight against al-Shabaab formations, the IGS says.
It concludes that this will instead fuel a new and potentially serious crisis with Ethiopia, which has already expressed its concerns and denounced the arrival of the Egyptian military as an attempt to exploit Somalia to destabilise the region.
Outgoing ATMIS Djiboutian troops commended for fostering peace in Somalia. Pool
After November 15, the UN Security Council is expected to formally approve the mandate of Aussom and operational reach, which will be more defined in nature and with more specific functions in favor of Somali security forces.
This week, an AU-UN delegation concluded an eight-day visit to Somalia, meeting stakeholders planning the Aussom, and as the meetings kicked off, Rashid Abdi, Horn of Africa analyst tweeted that Egypt’s impending deployment was facing opposition from different corners.
According to an Atmis release, the delegation met Somali defence and security agencies, envoys of the five TCCs and international partners US, UK, Qatar and Türkiye.
EU still in or out?
The statement, however, did not mention the delegation holding meetings with the EU, the single largest funder of the AU’s peacekeeping missions in Somalia since 2007, having spent a total of €2.6 billion ($2.85 billion), to foot troops’ salaries for Atmis and its predecessor, Amisom.
At the peak of its deployment, Amisom was a 22,000-strong force of uniformed personnel.
A spokesperson for the EU said the bloc’s envoys held meetings with the AU and UN officials,and have no opposition to Egypt’s presence in Somalia as part of the Aussom, whose troop contributing countries are not yet agreed—a decision hinged on the Somali government.
“The EU has no preference for any country to be part of the new mission, and we are not part of the decision-making process. However, we expect any country part of the mission to focus 100 percent on the fight against al-Shabaab,” the EU spokesperson said.
But Brussels raised old fears of persistent funding challenges that have threatened the AU missions, stating that donors must equally share the burden of footing the peacekeeping force’s salaries, materiel to avoid old spilling over into the incoming operation.
“As the main financial contributor to Amisom/Atmis since its creation, having provided funding of €2.6 billion since 2007, the EU has always said it was aiming at a better burden sharing between international partners,” the EU said.
Still, the stakeholders worry that the ongoing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia over the MoU with Somaliland to use its sea route could derail the plans, adding a problem on the future of war on al-Shabaab.
Dr Korir Sing’oei, Kenya’s Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, this week indicated that Nairobi was concerned about the tensions between Addis and Mogadishu, as they risk derailing efforts at tackling violent extremists.
“We are quite distressed by the disagreement between our two friendly nations of Ethiopia and Somalia,” Dr Sing’oei told The EastAfrican.
“A region already riven by instability cannot afford another conflict, hence Kenya’s insistence that diplomatic pathway to the resolution of emerging issues must be sought. Kenya remains ready to work with all parties towards finding common ground.”
Experts poring over the triangular tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia say al-Shabaab could profit from the distraction, plunging the region into regular attacks.
“While the two have mostly bickered diplomatically, and Ethiopian troops have remained stationed in Somalia, it has also slowed down the momentum and diverted attention and energy from al-Shabaab,” said Africa Policy Institute, a think-tank in Nairobi, in its weekly brief known as the HornTalk.
“In Somalia, some voices have even repackaged the group as a ‘nationalist’ force to counter Ethiopia. Indeed, al-Shabaab have publicly voiced opposition to the MoU. But that is the only point of agreement with the Federal Government to which it seeks to destroy and turn the country into some kind of caliphate.”
The US said this week the tension between the two neighbours had already cut cooperation on al-Shabaab, something that was raising concerns in Washington.
Gen Michael Langley, Commander of the US Africa Command (Africom), admitted the actual operations on al-Shabaab had somewhat reduced since tensions began.
“There is limited operations with the Ethiopians at this time. Time will tell if they will settle their differences,” he told the VOA on October 1.
“Because, when they do work together, they are very effective in clearing out al-Shabaab. One of the anchor, frontline countries, is Ethiopia. So that is what has me concerned. The liberation and stabilisation (of southwestern Somalia) has been valuable. So that is what has me concerned,” he said referring to Ethiopia’s operational sectors in Somalia.
Somali people march against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal at the Yarisow stadium in Mogadishu, Somalia on January 3, 2024. Reuters
According to the Atlantic Council, a US think-tank, the tussle between Ethiopia and Egypt is largely based on their interests, even though they have taken advantage of the quarrel over the MoU.
Addis Ababa thinks replacing their troops with Egypt is a slap in the face for the Ethiopian troops who sacrificed in Somalia.
“For the Egyptians, this is an opportunity to exert regional influence and pressure the Ethiopians,” the Atlantic Council said in a bulletin that also warned that lack of cooperation “undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort—and a weakened counterterrorism environment is fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to gain footing in its efforts to destabilise the Horn of Africa.”
The Atmis drawdown was already weakening the momentum on al-Shabaab, warned the bulletin by the Africa Policy Institute, leaving the nascent Somali security forces exposed.
The new Africa Union Force could plug some holes.
“But the Aussom faces a real risk of the headwinds of Western scepticism and silent opposition around funding and composition,” the institute said in an assessment on Thursday.
At the UN Security Council, where the issue came to the floor on Thursday, countries also debated the tensions, but also disagreed on the funding model.
Robert Wood, US Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs, said reaching an agreement on a post-Atmis force was urgent.
“The international community must maintain focus on this transition, which is critical to our shared security. We are deeply concerned about rising tension between Ethiopia and Somalia and the negative impact it is having on shared security interests,” he said.
“Regional tensions must not distract Somalia from critical state-building challenges or efforts to degrade al-Shabaab.”
The African Union and troop contributors had argued for Aussom to be funded under the UN mechanism of supporting peacekeeping missions. Under the new Resolution 2719, the UN is supposed to provide “predictable and sustainable financing for African Union–led peace support operations (PSOs).”
Atmis has relied on funding from donors, including a $61 million traditional support from the European Union, the main funder.
Sources told The EastAfrican that the new mission will need at least $100 million more to keep it on its feet.
“We recognise some have advocated applying the UN Security Council Resolution 2719 framework to the new AU mission. This is not the time or place to apply 2719. We must coordinate closely to ensure the requisite mechanisms are fully in place in order to set a future 2719 mission up for success,” Wood told the UN Security Council on Thursday.
“We believe, and many partners agree, that we must avoid premature application of the framework, which would undermine its credibility. Successful application will be critical to maintaining international confidence in and support for this tool in the long run.”
Many of Somalia’s key donors side with the US, seeing Aussom as not just a peacekeeping force but one supplementing Somalia’s security agencies.
At a meeting on October 1, the Somalia Quint, which brings together the US, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, said they would back Somalia’s programmes to generate more capable forces within a shorter time “to facilitate more effective near-term operations and to assist the FGS (Federal Government of Somalia) to develop a long-term training capability.”
They backed Aussom, but indicated that there was a need to ensure broad stakeholder input in the planning process, “including from troop contributors, to produce a mission with feasible and resource-informed goals and tasks and a clear exit strategy synchronised with Somalia’s security sector capacity-building.”
Ethiopia, meanwhile, sees Somalia’s engagement of Egypt as dangerous for the region. According to a dispatch from Addis Ababa, Somalia’s weak arms inventory management system means that the Egyptian arms could be smuggled to al-Shabaab. It also warned that tensions could cut intelligence sharing between troop contributors, allowing the extremists to filter through.
Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti and Burundi countries had initially accepted to deploy their troops to Aussom, subject to Somalia’s acceptance and based on AU’s Concept of Operations for the new mission.
On Thursday, Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi said Somalia was actively consulting with the African Union and United Nations regarding post-Atmis security arrangements for 2025, which he said should be funded under Resolution 2719. But he said Ethiopia wasn’t welcome.
“The claim that Ethiopia is in Somalia to fight terrorism is a veil for their true intentions of occupation and annexation of Somali territory. The real motive behind the recent hostile attitude towards its neighbouring countries is an attempt to divert attention from its serious internal issues,” Fiqi said, claiming Ethiopia had illegally made three arms shipments into Somalia in the past one month.
Experts say Somali forces have often failed to hold on to liberated areas because they are stretched thin, requiring a longer back up by foreign troops.
James Swan, acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, said Mogadishu was also confronted with other challenges, including humanitarian needs and expanding its forces.
“I urge Ethiopia and Somalia to engage in good faith in these diplomatic efforts and to avoid actions that could lead to escalation. This is essential given the possible negative ramifications for stability in the region, including the potential impact on the post-Atmis transition.”
By Julius Barigaba & Aggrey Mutambo
