Wednesday 4 Sep 2024 {HMC} Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi arrived in Ankara on Wednesday in his first official visit to Turkey since becoming president 10 years ago.
The visit reciprocates President Recep Tayyib Erdogan’s trip to Cairo in February, which marked an official end to the diplomatic and political hostility between the two governments that began when Sisi ousted his democratically elected predecessor Mohamed Morsi, an Erdogan ally, in a military coup in 2013.
“Turkey-Egypt relations will be reviewed in all their aspects, and possible joint steps in the coming period to further develop cooperation will be discussed,” the Turkish presidency said on Tuesday.
“There will be an exchange of views on current regional and global issues, especially the Israeli attacks on Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories”.
Speaking ahead of the visit, several Turkish officials told Middle East Eye that Ankara would like to sell weapons, especially drones, to Cairo and increase their ongoing energy and trade cooperation.
Erdogan and Sisi are expected to sign agreements in areas of finance, energy, environment, urban planning and health during the visit on Wednesday, a Turkish official told MEE.
Bilgehan Ozturk, a regional expert at the Ankara-based Seta think tank, told MEE that Ankara intends to diversify its gas resources and seeks to increase the amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) it imports from Egypt.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said during a visit to Cairo last month that both countries are focused on extending the scope of a free trade agreement and restarting the ro-ro maritime transport line between Mersin and Alexandria.
“The relationship between the two countries is multifaceted as both cooperate in the Middle East for Gaza ceasefire talks, and over Libya and Somalia,” Ozturk said. “This is a highly symbolic visit but it also means they would want to show to the world that they would like to work together to bring peace back to the region.”
“The visit will turn normalisation into an institutional framework, with the initiation of a Strategic Cooperation Council between the two countries, which represents the highest level of coordination between two states,” said Ammar Fayed, an Egyptian analyst.
The first meeting of the council will be held on Wednesday, according to Egyptian media. The council will convene annually, similar to the model Turkey has with the UAE, Fayed added.
Drone sales
One of the breakthroughs in relations could be the sale of drones and other military equipment to Egypt.
A high-level Egyptian military delegation visited Turkey’s two major drone producers, Baykar and TAI, in May.
Sources familiar with the negotiations said Egypt has also expressed interest in purchasing Hisar-class offshore patrol vessels produced by Turkish state company ASFAT and enquired about the possibility of receiving modernisation services for armoured vehicles. “Both TAI and Baykar made offers to the Egyptian military earlier this year,” one defence industry source told MEE. “However, Egyptians are yet to take steps on the possible patrol vessel sale and for the modernisation of armoured vehicles.”
Turkish-made jet trainer Hurjet also performed at an international air show in Egypt this week, showcasing the success of the Turkish defence industry.
The sale of Turkish drones to Egypt, if it takes place during this visit or in the future, will mark a significant turning point in the relationship between the two countries, said Ammar Fayed, a geopolitical analyst and head of research at the Turkey-based Asbab think tank.
“If Egypt acquires drones from Turkey, it would be considered a new chapter in relations, something that hasn’t happened since the founding of the Turkish Republic,” he told MEE.
“This type of cooperation entails long-term relations and introduces a new dimension of collaboration. If Turkish drones are sent, it would mean that Turkish soldiers would go to Egypt to train the Egyptian army for joint operations for some time,” he added.
“Military cooperation provides a justification for long-term relations regardless of any disagreements. Turkey is keen on this, while Egypt has been cautious, at least until May,” he said.
Potential complications
However, on the other hand, a potential drone sale to Egypt could complicate ties with Turkish ally Ethiopia, whose tensions with Egypt are at an all-time high.
But Ethiopia has continued the filling of the Renaissance Dam unilaterally over the past three years despite the opposition of downstream countries Egypt and Sudan whose share of the Nile water will be reduced as a result of the project. The fifth filling of the dam began in July, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed recently declared the future operation of its turbines in defiance of Cairo and Khartoum.
In a sign of major escalation, Egypt’s foreign minister on Sunday sent a letter to the UN Security Council accusing Ethiopia of breaching international law and trilateral agreements with Egypt and Sudan, and using negotiations as a cover to impose a fait accompli.
Cairo, in coordination with Ankara, also pledged to deploy military force to Somalia as part of a peace mission to counterbalance Ethiopia’s attempt to establish a naval base through breakaway state Somaliland.
A Somali official last week said that Egypt had delivered arms to Somalia and would provide training to its troops, in the latest Egyptian challenge to Ethiopia.
Bilateral trade improved
Since the normalisation drive began between the two countries in 2021, bilateral trade has significantly improved. There are currently an estimated 720 Turkish companies operating in the Egyptian market, while Turkish investments have reached $2.5 billion in February and are expected to reach $3 billion by the end of the year, according to Turkish officials.
The current trade volume between the two countries is approximately $7 billion, but Erdogan aims to increase it to $15 billion.
With sizable populations and geographic proximity, the potential for lucrative trade is very high, say economic experts.
“The unique geographic locations of both countries could make Turkey Egypt’s gateway to exporting products to Central Asia, particularly the Turkish-speaking countries and the Balkans, where Turkey has significant soft power and a strong presence,” said Mourad Aly, a strategy and investment consultant and CEO of a number of companies.
“Conversely, Egypt serves as a gateway to the African market, especially with the COMESA agreement and the customs exemptions and other benefits it offers,” he added.
Additionally, Egypt is keen on localising manufacturing to reduce import costs and Turkey is seeking to expand manufacturing in Egypt, leveraging Egypt’s agreements with African countries.
Preliminary agreements have already been made over the past three years of rapproachment, such as an industrial zone in Marsa Matrouh and another in the Suez Canal.
The existing Turkish industrial zones in 10th of Ramadan and other areas have expanded over the past year with the improvement in relations between the two countries.
Turkey’s interest in expanding its external markets is driven by the need to overcome the high production costs in Turkey following the economic crisis and inflation, which have impacted the capabilities of small and medium-sized manufacturers who can no longer afford wages or compete in foreign markets, according to Fayed.
“The Egyptian market still has much lower production, labor, and energy costs than Turkey, which benefits Egypt by attracting foreign currency and creating job opportunities,” he told MEE.
Eastern Mediterranean tensions
Despite the significant trade boom and the fact that Egypt has become Turkey’s largest trading partner in Africa, the primary motivation for Turkey to develop relations has been its interests in maritime border demarcation in the Eastern Mediterranean, analysts said.
Turkey seeks to sign a maritime boundary demarcation agreement with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Egypt is wary of allienating its allies in the Eastern Mediterranean by being perceived as acquiessing to Turkish claims over its maritime borders.
One of Turkey’s objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean is to ensure that the conflict with Greece remains bilateral and does not turn into a wider regional conflict, as seen with the alliance between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which is part of a broader geopolitical alliance against Turkey, according to Khaled Fouad, an energy expert and geopolitical analyst.
Egypt excluded Turkey when establishing the forum in 2020, prompting the latter to attempt to build bridges with Cairo to preserve its interests.
“Turkey seeks to dismantle this alliance and break its isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean, aiming to keep the historical conflict with Greece as a bilateral issue only,” Fouad told MEE.
Turkey has signed maritime demarcation agreements with Libya and Greece, and signing a similar agreement with Egypt would strengthen its position in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, even if Egypt signs any agreement with Turkey, it will not agree to anything that contradicts its alliance with Greece, Fayed said.
“The alliance with Greece remains central to Egypt’s calculations in the Eastern Mediterranean, which, from Egypt’s perspective, provides strength and balance in regional influence compared to Turkey.”
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By Ragip Soylu and Sondos Asem